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Abstract
A broad political economics literature explains the introduction and
expansion of pension systems, but the effects caused by the endogenous
reduction of fertility are typically disregarded, as the fertility choice is
usually considered exogenous. This paper suggests a political model that
takes into account these effects and analyzes the net effect of the reduc-
tion of fertility costs on the dimension of pension systems. Some stylized
facts support an inverted-U development pattern: a continuous and pro-
gressive increase of the fertility cost, after inducing the introduction of
pension systems, tends to reduce, ceteris paribus, their political support.
JEL classification: H55; D72; O15; J13; J14
Keywords: Family economics; Fertility; Political sustainability; Social se-
curity; Voting
1 Introduction
In the last century, in most developed countries, the transition from a state
with low economic growth and a primarily rural economy to a state with fast
growth and industrial economy had some strong effects on the domestic economy
causing, on the one hand, a huge reduction of the fertility rate and, on the other
hand, the introduction and subsequent development of pension spending.
Among the factors that led to the decline of the fertility rate one can list:
the increase of the return on human capital, which induces the substitution
of quantity with quality of children (see Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and
Barro, 1988; Barro and Becker, 1989; Galor and Weil, 2000); the agricultural
and medical development, which reduced the mortality rate and its volatility,
hence reducing the need for a high number of children (see Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002);
the change in family relations (weakening of the family ties, reduction of the
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socioeconomic differences between men and women), which induced a reversal
in the direction of the net wealth flows reducing the economic attractiveness of
fertility (see Caldwell, 1976, 1978; Boldrin and Jones, 2002); some social policies
(pensions, compulsory education, child labour regulation), usually accompany-
ing the economic development, which increased the fertility costs and decreased
the fertility benefits (see Leibenstein, 1957; Caldwell, 1976, 1978; Cigno and
Rosati, 1992).
As regards the introduction and development of unfunded pension systems,
a broad literature has studied this phenomenon, developing models that explain
why they exist and have been continuously expanding during the 20th century.
The question that immediately arises is why these pension systems exist and
why their growth is supported by the voters: it needs to be noticed, in fact,
that the main purpose of pension systems is to transfer wealth from a majority
of worker-voters to a minority of pensioner-voters. Since the Seventies, numer-
ous papers have tried to answer this question, and some interesting reviews
of the literature are offered by Breyer (1994), Galasso and Profeta (2002) and
de Walque (2005). Focusing the attention only on the voting models, which is
the approach taken by the present paper, Galasso and Profeta (2002) identify
five motives for the introduction of pension system: dynamic inefficiency, limited
time horizon, crowding-out of the investment, intragenerational redistribution
and optimal social contract.
The first explanation for the political support to pension systems is given
by their economic attractiveness in the special case of dynamic inefficiency: if
the ratio between interest rate and growth rate, also called Aaron variable, is
less than one then the present value of the wealth of future generations does
not converge, therefore a pay-as-you-go pension system (and public debt) is
Pareto-improving (see Samuelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965; Aaron, 1966).
Another explanation is given by the fact that the portion of pension contri-
butions already payed are considered a sunk-cost by the voters, hence if for the
median voter the present value of the benefits coming from the pension system
is higher than the portion of contributions yet to be paid then a majority of
voters will support the pension system; moreover the older is the median voter,
the higher will be the size of the system (see Browning, 1975).
The third explanation relates to the crowding-out effect of pension systems
(and public debt) on investment, which increases the return on capital hence
motivating interest-earners to support it (see Cukierman and Meltzer, 1989;
Cooley and Soares, 1999; Boldrin and Rustichini, 2000).
A typical characteristic of pension systems is that contributions are propor-
tional to income, whereas benefits are partially independent of it, suggesting us
another explanation for the political support for pension system: low-income
voters are favourable toward the introduction and development of pension sys-
tems (see Tabellini, 1991, 2000; Casamatta et al., 2000).
The last explanation comes from the hypothesis of ascendant altruism: in-
dividuals tend to “undersave” during youth in order to obtain a transfer during
old age from the young generation, therefore the introduction of social security
would be Pareto-efficient and supported even under unanimity rule (see Hansson
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and Stuart, 1989; Veall, 1986, with funded pensions).
These motives, however, do not explain the timing of the introduction of
social security. In other words, they do not explain why pension system have
been implemented just at the same time as economic development. Several
reasons have been proposed as possible answers to this question, summarized
by Cutler and Johnson (2004) as follows: insurance against the risks of the
capitalist system (e.g., Great Depression and the 1935 U.S. Social Security
Act); political legitimacy of non-democratic governments (e.g., the German and
Argentinean social security systems introduced by Bismarck and Pero´n); the
Wagner’s law, which assumes social insurance as luxury good (e.g., U.K. and
Australia implemented social security when they were the richest countries in
the world, and it was financed by general revenue); the demographic hetero-
geneity, which may induce the implementation of income redistribution policies;
the Leviathan theory, which claims that the governments tend to expand their
range of action; the demonstration effect, which induces countries to copy their
neighbours’successful policies.
Caucutt et al. (2007) suggest the transition from a rural economy to an urban
one as a possible explanation for the development of pension systems. They
conclude that the urbanization is led by the faster technological progress of the
city compared with that of the farm and the increase of the life expectancy,
because of the larger productivity of the urban economy, and the need for a
larger amount of savings. This transition caused the passage from a rural median
voter, who grounds his old-age economic security on the land rent and is not
interested in a pension system (even though it could be more profitable), to an
urban median voter, who has a flat (or even hump-shaped) age-earning profile,
therefore more favourable to the introduction of the pension system.
This last model draws a parallel with the Caldwell hypothesis about fertility:
the economic transition from a rural-Malthusian to a urban-Solowian economic
system affects the domestic economy; the individuals cannot ground their old-
age economic security on children (Caldwell) and land factor (Caucutt et al.),
hence, on the one hand, they choose to reduce their fertility, triggering the
demographic transition and, on the other hand, support a system which is able
to substitute the old familiar structure. Since the reduction of the overall fertility
rate affects the attractiveness of a pay-as-you-go pension system, the economic
transition has two opposite effects on it.
The purpose of the present paper is to study these two effects, in order to
evaluate their empirical relevance on the development of pension system. It
will be suggested a model which tries to evaluate the effects of the increase
of fertility cost on the introduction of pension system, taking into account the
effect of fertility reduction. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents
the model, section 3 presents some stylized facts which support the theoretical
model and section 4 concludes.
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2 The basic model
2.1 The environment
In our economy agents live for two periods: middle-age and old age. Moreover
the economy has two locations, the farm and the city : in the farm the fertility
cost is lower than in the city. A proportion γt of the population lives in the
city and the others live in the farm. Individuals differ in their first period
income (wi), which is distributed in the population with mean w and cumulative
distribution function F (·). The objective function of a middle-aged agent born
in t, living in the k ∈ (C,F ) location and having an income level wi is:
u(cik1,t, c
ik
2,t+1) ≡ ln(cik1,t) + β ln(cik2,t+1) (1)
In the first period each agent i receives wi units of good, upon which she has
to transfer a fixed share of her income δ and pay a contribution to the pension
system τt proportional to her income (if a pension system is established), with
0 ≤ τt ≤ 1 − δ. Moreover, she chooses how many children to have: for each
child she bears a cost of θk, which is lower for farmers. The income that is
not invested in children should be consumed, otherwise it is wasted. Hence the
budget constraint for the first period is:
cik1,t + θ
kN ikt ≤ (1− δ − τt)wi (2)
In the second period, agents receive an average transfer δw from the child they
had in the first period. Moreover agents receive a transfer from the social
security system, which is equal to the total amount of contributions collected
by the system from workers of the following generation. Hence the budget
constraint in the second period is:
cik2,t+1 ≤ δwN ikt + τt+1wNt (3)
where Nt is the total (or mean) fertility, hence it is given by:
Nt ≡ γtN c + (1− γt)Nf
where Nk stands for the mean fertility in location k.
It should be noticed that as savings are not allowed, the only way in which
agents can voluntary transfer wealth from the first period to the second is by
having children. In this economy, children are perceived as investment, and this
investment is more profitable for farmers than for urban residents.
Similarly to Boldrin and Rustichini (2000), I assume that there exist a se-
quence {γ(j)}∞j=0 such that:
γ(j + 1) > γ(j) ∀j
lim
j→∞
γ(j) = 1
Pr(γt+1 = γ(j); γt = γ(j)) = 1− p
Pr(γt+1 = γ(j + 1); γt = γ(j)) = p
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The choice to establish a social security system is taken by vote. The “win-
ner” policy τt is determined by majority vote. The vote will take place in t if
γt 6= γt−1, otherwise τt = τt+1.
The social security system allows people to transfer wealth to their old-age,
but the amount they can transfer is chosen collectively. Therefore there are
agents who would prefer to transfer more than what is established, and they
will have children, and other agents who would like to transfer a smaller amount,
and they will not have children (actually they would like to have a “negative”
amount of children, which is obviously not possible).
2.2 Voters’ behaviour
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3), with respect to the choice variables
{cik1,t, cik2,t+1, N ikt }, we obtain the following conditions:
cik1,t =
wi
(1 + rk)(1 + β)
[
(1− δ)(1 + rk)− τt(1 + rk) + τt+1Ntw
wi
]
(4)
cik2,t+1 =
βwi
(1 + β)
[
(1− δ)(1 + rk)− τt(1 + rk) + τt+1Ntw
wi
]
(5)
N ikt =
β
θk(1 + β)
[
(1− δ − τt)wi − τt+1wNt
β(1 + rk)
]
(6)
where (1 + rk) ≡ δwθk is the return on the familiar investment.
It should be noticed that for every pair (τ◦t , τ
◦
t+1), there exists a threshold
endowment w◦k, such that agents living in k with endowment lower than w◦k
will not have children:
w◦k =
τ◦t+1wNt
β(1 + rk)(1− δ − τ◦t )
The effect on individual fertility of an increase in τt or in τt+1 is unambiguously
non-positive: as τt increases, the agents have a smaller available income to invest
on children, and as τt+1 increases they already have a larger amount of transfer
from the pension system in the second period, then they need to shift a smaller
amount of income to the old-age through children investment.
Moreover, from (6), we can easily see that urban residents have a lower
fertility than farmers, then as γt increases the total fertility will decrease.
Assuming that wi is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the total fertility
in k is:
Nkt ≡
∫ 1
w◦k
N ikt dw
i
=
β
2(1 + β)θk
[
1− δ − τt − τt+1Nt
β(1 + rk)
(
1 +
3τt+1Nt
4β(1 + rk)(1− δ − τt)
)]
(7)
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2.3 Political equilibrium
Substituting (4) and (5) in the utility function (1), we get the following indirect
utility function
V ikt (τt, τt+1) = β ln [β(1 + rk)] + (1 + β) ln
w
(1 + rk)(1 + β)
+
+ (1 + β) ln
[
(1− δ − τt)(1 + rk) + τt+1wNt(τt, τt+1; γt)
wi
]
(8)
Let τ˜j be the “winner” policy when γt = γ(j). Taking into account the
dynamic of γt and the voting mechanism, we know that τt+1 = τt = τ˜j with
probability (1−p) and τt+1 = τ˜j+1 with probability p. Now the voter’s problem
is to maximize V ikt with respect to (τ˜j , τ˜j+1).
It can be shown that ∂V
ik
t
∂τ˜j+1
> 0 for any (τ˜j , τ˜j+1): intuitively, this means
that every voter born in t has an incentive to vote τt+1 = 1 if in t + 1 voting
will take place.
More interesting is the question about the preferred τ˜j . Differentiating (8)
with respect to τ˜j , we get:
∂V ikt
∂τ˜j
=
1 + β
%ik
{
w
wi
[
(1− p)Nt + τt+1
(
∂Nt
∂τt
+ (1− p) ∂Nt
∂τt+1
)]
− (1 + rk)
}
(9)
where %ik ≡ (1− δ − τt)(1 + rk) + τt+1wNtwi .
A marginal increase in the rate of contribution τ˜j has three effects on the
voters’ indirect utility. First, an increase in the share of income compulsorily
invested in the pension system: this effect depends on the return on pension
system, which is higher for poorer voters. Second, a decrease in the return on
pension system, keeping fixed the amount of income invested in it. Third, a
decrease in the share of income invested in children: this effect depends on the
return on children, which is higher in the farm than in the city.
The sign and the size of the overall effect is different between farmers and
urban residents and between poor and rich voters: farmers have a larger negative
effect, as they have to give up a larger return from children; rich voters have a
smaller positive effect, as for them the return on pensions is smaller.
We can rewrite equation (9) as follows:
∂V ikt
∂τ˜j
=
1 + β
W ik
{
w
1 + rk
[
(1− p)Nt + τt+1
(
∂Nt
∂τt
+ (1− p) ∂Nt
∂τt+1
)]
− wi
}
(10)
where W ik ≡ (1− δ − τt)wi + τt+1wNt1+rk .
From this equation we can easily identify a pair of farmer and urban resident
who have similar preference toward the policy rule. In fact we get:
wif =
1 + rc
1 + rf
wic (11)
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For any urban resident with income wic, there is always a farmer, with income
wif , with the same preference toward the policy rule, and the farmer is always
poorer than his urban correspondent. Since a farmer has a higher return from
children investment, he must have a lower income (then a higher return from
pension) in order to prefer the same level of pension as an urban resident.
Since preferences are monotonic in endowment, the single crossing condition
is satisfied and a Condorcet winning tax rate does exist. To find the equilibrium
policy, we need to know which is the pair of voters (a farmer and an urban
resident) who play the median voter role. Let w∗k be the endowment of a voter
resident in k and with preferred policy τ˜∗j ; setting (10) equal to zero and solving
for w∗k, we find that the relation between favourite policy and endowment is
given by:
w∗k =
w
1 + rk
[
(1− p)Nt + (pτ˜j+1 + (1− p)τ˜∗j )
(
∂Nt
∂τt
+ (1− p) ∂Nt
∂τt+1
)]
(12)
Let τ˜∗mj be the equilibrium policy at time t, when γt = γ(j); in equilibrium, the
number of voters who support τ˜j > τ˜∗mj must be equal to the number of voters
who support τ˜j < τ˜∗mj . In the first coalition there will be all the elderly and
the poorer among the middle-aged voters (with a larger proportion among the
urban residents, as they are more favourable to the pension system).
Hence, the political equilibrium is defined by the following equation:
γ(j)F [w∗c(τ˜∗mj )] + (1− γ(j))F [w∗f (τ˜∗mj )] +
1
Nt−1
=
1
2
(
1 +
1
Nt−1
)
(13)
Using equations (11) and (12), and assuming that the income is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1, the equilibrium is implicitly defined by the follow-
ing equation:
w
[
(1− p)Nt(τ˜∗mj ) + (pτ˜j+1 + (1− p)τ˜∗mj )
(
∂Nt
∂τt
+ (1− p) ∂Nt
∂τt+1
)]
×
×
(
γ(j)
1 + rc
+
1− γ(j)
1 + rf
)
=
Nt−1 − 1
2Nt−1
(14)
A higher level of urbanization has two opposite effects: it increases the
weight of urban voters, who are more willing to support the pension system,
but it also decrease the fertility, making the pension system less attractive. It
is important to stress that this second effect is not captured in a model with
exogenous fertility; therefore in this model the positive effect of the urbanization
on the probability of introduction of the pension system is dampened, and the
relation pattern between pension expenditure and urbanization is ambiguous.
Using implicit differentiation on equation (14), we can find the derivative of
the relation between the equilibrium contribution rate (τ˜∗mj ) and the weight of
urban population (γ(j)):
∂τ˜∗mj
∂γ(j)
= −
RjΛ(τ˜∗mj , γ(j)) +
∂Λ(τ˜∗mj ,γ(j))
∂γ(j)
∂Λ(τ˜∗m
j
,γ(j))
∂τ˜∗m
j
(15)
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where
Λ(τ˜∗mj , γ(j)) ≡
∂(τ˜∗mj Nt)
∂τ˜∗mj
= (1− p)Nt + τt+1
(
∂Nt
∂τt
+ (1− p) ∂Nt
∂τt+1
)
and
Rj ≡ rf − rc
γ(j)(1 + rf ) + (1− γ(j))(1 + rc)
.
In equilibrium the function Λ is always positive, as long as the elderly are
not the majority (see equation (12); moreover, if Λ was negative, a reduction of
τ˜∗mj would increase disposable income during middle and old-age); therefore, as
Rj is positive as well, the first term in the numerator of (15) is positive. It can
be shown that the numerator of (15) is equal to zero when γ(j) = 12 . Moreover it
can be numerically shown that the denominator is negative. Hence, expression
(15) is positive up to γ(j) = 12 , and negative afterward.
3 Stylized facts
The main conclusion of the model is that the weakening of family ties at first
promotes the introduction of pension systems, due to the reduction of the eco-
nomic support from the descendants and the need for substitution between a
familiar system and a centralized one, and then causes a reduction of the po-
litical support, due to the reduction of total fertility and resulting reduction of
the profitability of the centralized system.
This section will show the results of some estimation in order to find if a
similar pattern may be supported by the data.
3.1 Methodology
The basic specification that will be used for the regression is the linear model:
τi = β0 + β1γi + β2γ2i + β3wi + β4Nt,i + β5Nt−1,i,+ui (16)
The idea is to test the coefficients β1 and β2, in order to pick up the prevalent
development pattern. On the strength of what has been said above, we expect
β2 to be negative, whereas the relation between β1 and β2 will allow us to pick
up the pattern (since γ is measured in percentage, if β1 > −200β2 the relation
is monotonically increasing, if 0 < β1 < −200β2 the relation is an inverted-U,
whereas if β1 < 0 the relation is monotonically decreasing; see figure 1).
Initially, I use the OLS method and, after an endogeneity test, I eventually
use the IV estimator. Moreover, at first cross-sectional results are shown, and
then those obtained with panel-data.
8
Figure 1: Possible development patterns of pension systems
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. N Min Max
SSRT Social contributions (% of
GDP)
5.49 5.31 90 0 17.94
URB Urban population (% of
the total)
62.51 21.66 90 9.16 100
OPOP Over-65 population (% of
the total)
9.34 5.19 90 1.08 18.88
GDPPC Per-capita GDP, PPP
(thousands of 2005 inter-
national dollars)
14.03 13.02 90 0.34 65.81
TFR Total fertility rate 2.37 1.3 90 0.84 6.8
CMR Child mortality rate (un-
der 5 per 1000 births)
37.14 46.38 89 3.22 186.1
SCFMRT Ratio of female to male in
the secondary school en-
rollment
99.58 12.68 87 42.6 121.3
GINI Gini index 39.08 9.43 66 25 60.05
TAXAT Tax revenue (% of GDP) 16.28 6.3 90 0.96 29.53
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (2002 cross-section)
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3.2 The data set
Given the specification (16), the data set needs to include:
SSRT the dimension of pension system, measured by the ratio between contri-
butions and GDP;
URB the urban rate, that is the ratio of urban to total population;
GDPPC the per-capita GDP based on PPP;
TFR the total fertility rate, that is the number of children that would be born
to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and
bear children in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates;
OPOP the size of old-age population, measured by the ratio of over-65 to total
population.
Moreover I will use some control variables, the Gini index (GINI), as a measure
of income heterogeneity, and the fiscal incidence (TAXAT), measured by the
ratio of fiscal contributions to GDP.
For the endogeneity test and the IV regressions other two variables will be
used: the child (under the age of five) mortality rate (CMR) and the female
education level, measured by the ratio of female to male secondary enrollment
(SCFMRT). Thus, I consider such variables relevant in explaining the fertility
rate (because of the “hoarding” effect and the Caldwell hypothesis about social
policy and fertility cost), but exogenous with respect to the estimated model.
The data used are those provided by the World Bank1. Since we need a
data set which include the largest possible number of countries, we can perform
two type of analysis: either a cross-sectional one on 2002 data (the year with
the highest number of observations) and, if not available, on the closest ones, or
a panel one on five-year average data between 1990 and 2005, which will have
a limited validity because of the smaller number of observations per country.
Using the cross-sectional data we can analyze up to 90 countries (except when we
will include the Gini index in the regression, reducing the number of observations
to 66). The countries included in the study are listed in appendix A.
Figure 2 shows a scatter plot of the contribution rate versus urban population
rate, which loosely support a hump shaped relation between family ties and size
of pension system.
3.3 Estimates
Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis. Model A is the basis one,
represented by equation (16), whereas the others add more control variables.
It is important to notice that B and D estimations include a smaller number
of countries, because of the fewer observations of the Gini index, therefore the
results are not perfectly comparable.
1World Bank, World Development Indicators April 2008, ESDS International, University
of Manchester
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Variable A B C D B2 B2-IV
URB 0.1053∗∗ 0.1753∗∗∗ 0.0948∗∗ 0.1733∗∗∗ 0.1778∗∗∗ 0.1514∗∗
(2.385) (2.867) (2.103) (2.881) (2.935) (2.499)
URBSQ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0011∗
(-2.583) (-2.504) (-2.444) (-2.569) (-2.49) (-1.969)
OPOP 0.8485∗∗∗ 0.7632∗∗∗ 0.8837∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.7946∗∗∗ 0.6926∗∗∗
(9.577) (6.685) (9.725) (6.658) (7.592) (6.144)
GDPPC 0.055∗ 0.0242 0.0598∗∗ 0.0126
(1.981) (0.833) (2.134) (0.422)
TFR 0.2674 0.5195∗ 0.2918 0.4834∗ 0.5807∗∗ 0.1054
(0.97) (1.966) (1.068) (1.85) (2.149) (0.331)
GINI -0.1222∗∗∗ -0.1181∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.1331∗∗∗
(-3.017) (-2.909) (-3.101) (-3.192)
TAXAT -0.0593 0.081
(-0.894) (1.121)
Constant -5.4967∗∗∗ -3.3746 -4.6515∗∗ -4.3179∗ -3.5276 -0.8212
(-3.231) (-1.475) (-2.244) (-1.941) (-1.556) (-0.322)
URBMAX 46.707 63.902 45.004 63.200 66.749 70.513
(5.455) (7.914) (6.853) (7.601) (8.817) (12.065)
N 90 66 90 66 66 65
AIC 448.694 309.96 449.427 310.121 308.593
BIC 463.693 325.288 466.925 327.639 321.731
R2 0.732 0.804 0.735 0.809 0.802 0.806
∗ 10% significant; ∗∗ 5% significant; ∗∗∗ 1% significant
Standard errors are Huber-White corrected
T-statistics in parentheses for the estimated coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses for the estimated URBMAX
Table 2: Cross-section estimates
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The first evident observation is the important role played by the share of
elderly: this result is quite predictable, both from a political viewpoint (elderly
get a stronger political power) and from an economic one (a higher number of
elderly requires a bigger pension system). The estimated coefficients imply that
a 1% increase in the old-age share of the population induces a 0.8% increase in
the ratio between social contributions and GDP.
The URB and URBSQ estimated coefficients support the concavity of the
relation, and in particular the inverted-U pattern: for low levels of the urban-
ization rate, as it increases the pension system expands, but for higher levels of
urbanization the relation is inverted. URBMAX is the estimated maximum of
the relation. The considerable difference between the models including the Gini
index or not may be ascribed to the reduction of the observed countries, hence
to a different distribution of the URB variable.
The per-capita income level seems to have a small positive effect on the
dimension of pension system, as claimed by the Wagner law. However, such
effect is rather limited, and it is not significant when the Gini index is taken
into account.
The Gini index is significant, but the sign of the estimated coefficient is
negative, which seems to contradict the hypothesis that a higher income hetero-
geneity leads to bigger pension system, due to the demand of income redistri-
bution policies. The negative relation, instead, seems to catch the effect of the
welfare state level of development: in countries where higher is the development
of welfare state, the Gini index is lower as outcome of the income redistribution
policies. Moreover, when the Gini index enter the equation, it makes the per-
capita income not significant, absorbing its role of measure of the socioeconomic
development. The B2 model does not take into account the per-capita income
variable, and the results are not significantly different from the B model.
The fiscal incidence is never significant in explaining the size of pension
systems: this in part contradicts the Leviathan theory about the tendency of
governments to expand as much as possible the scope of their authority.
For the B2 model, I performed an endogeneity Hausman test on fertility,
using the child mortality rate and the ratio of female to male in the secondary
school enrollment, and the null hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected. Then
I estimated the B2 model, using the IV estimator, and the results are shown
in the last column of table 2. In the first stage, the two instruments resulted
highly significant and the F-statistic was equal to 64.82. The null hypotheses of
the J-test and the Sargan test about the exogeneity of the instruments were not
rejected (respectively with 0.513 and 0.582 p-value). The estimated coefficients
results quite similar to those obtained with the OLS estimator, and URBMAX
becomes higher, but not significantly.
In conclusion, all the estimates support the inverted-U pattern of develop-
ment. However the models provide noticeably different estimates of the max-
imum of such curve, in particular when the Gini index is taken into account
(probably because of the smaller number of observations and the consequent
different distribution of URB). The best estimates seem to be the A, because of
the higher number of observations, and the B2-IV, because it takes into account
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Variable A B C B2 A-IV A2-IV
URB 0.1623∗∗∗ 0.1428∗∗∗ 0.1585∗∗∗ 0.1407∗∗∗ 0.1494∗∗ 0.1434∗∗
(3.423) (3.036) (3.397) (2.933) (2.316) (2.247)
URBSQ -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.0013∗∗ -0.0012∗∗
(-3.227) (-2.396) (-3.189) (-2.139) (-2.351) (-2.316)
OPOP 0.4864∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.4796∗∗∗ 0.4995∗∗∗ 0.5768∗∗∗ 0.6046∗∗∗
(5.214) (3.298) (4.962) (4.512) (6.258) (7.474)
GDPPC 0.0263 0.0566 0.0236 0.0244
(0.905) (1.107) (0.881) (0.773)
TFR -0.2317∗ -0.1158 -0.2435∗ -0.0598 -0.0772 -0.1208
(-1.797) (-0.758) (-1.89) (-0.363) (-0.205) (-0.32)
GINI -0.111∗∗∗ -0.1184∗∗∗
(-3.439) (-3.292)
TAXAT 0.038
(1.051)
Constant -2.4842∗∗ 1.8052 -2.9188∗∗ 1.7376 -3.6474 -3.4024
(-2.124) (0.936) (-2.449) (0.875) (-1.299) (-1.208)
URBMAX 55.275 64.220 55.411 69.261 57.830 58.741
(4.714) (9.358) (4.847) (12.731) (7.827) (7.391)
N 226 130 226 131 182 186
Ng 99 75 99 76 95 98
g 2.283 1.733 2.283 1.724 1.916 1.898
R2 0.706 0.707 0.7 0.701 0.723 0.72
∗ 10% significant; ∗∗ 5% significant; ∗∗∗ 1% significant
Standard errors are cluster corrected
T-statistics in parentheses for the estimated coefficients
Standard errors in parentheses for the estimated URBMAX
Table 3: Panel estimates
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also the Gini index and seems to be more precise. Both models suggest that
over a certain level of urbanization, between 50 and 70%, the pension systems
tend to become smaller.
Table 3 shows the results of the panel analysis: the specification are analo-
gous to those of table 2, and are estimated with random effects.
The pattern supported by all the estimates is still the inverted-U one. The
maximum of the relation, again, depends on whether the Gini index is included
in the regression or not.
Both the per-capita income and the fiscal incidence are not significant,
whereas the Gini index is highly significant and, again, seems to have a negative
influence on the dimension of pension systems.
The fertility rate results significant only for the specifications which do not
include the Gini index. In this case the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis
of exogeneity, hence I used IV, and the results are shown in last two columns.
The main difference concerns the coefficient on old-age population, whereas the
maximum of the relation between pension system and urban population holds
essentially steady at 58%.
4 Conclusions
Part of the economic literature, and particularly the Caldwell hypothesis, ex-
plain the reduction of fertility with the evolution of the social structures and the
transition from a rural economy, in which the children were a source of wealth,
to a urban and westernized economy, in which children subtract resources from
the domestic economy.
The smaller ascendant intergenerational transfer causes the need for a social
policy able to maintain old-age consumption, stimulating the introduction of
pension systems and their expansion.
The theoretical model presented in section 2 analyzes the net effect of the
weakening of family ties on the dimension of pension system, taking into account
the reduction of fertility and, therefore, the reduction of the rate of return of
pay-as-you-go pension systems. The model concludes that the relation between
the strength of family ties and the dimension of pension system should be hump
shaped.
The empirical analysis, shown in section 3, supports this inverted-U devel-
opment pattern: a continuous and progressive weakening of family ties, after
inducing the introduction of pension systems, tends to reduce, ceteris paribus,
their political support.
The reduction of political support toward social security systems, caused by
the reduction of the fertility rate, is partially offset by the progressive ageing
of the population which, on the one hand, reduces as well the profitability of
pension system, but on the other hand increases the political weight of old-
age voters: the overall effect of the ageing of the population is positive, as
acknowledged by the previous literature in the field.
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However, if fertility rates continue their rapid decline, as in the past years,
pay-as-you-go pension systems may not be sufficiently profitable for them to be
supported by the majority of the voters, hence being destined to disappear or
replaced by the funded ones.
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A List of countries included in the study
Country Code Region Country Code Region
Albania ALB ECA Kenya KEN SSA
Argentina ARG LAC Korea, Rep. KOR AAS
Armenia ARM ECA Kuwait KWT EUR
Austria AUT EUR Latvia LVA ECA
Azerbaijan AZE ECA Lebanon LBN MNA
Bahrain BHR MNA Lithuania LTU ECA
Belarus BLR ECA Luxembourg LUX EUR
Belgium BEL EUR Macao, China MAC AAS
Bolivia BOL LAC Malta MLT EUR
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH ECA Mauritius MUS SSA
Bulgaria BGR ECA Mexico MEX LAC
Burundi BDI SSA Moldova MDA ECA
Cameroon CMR SSA Mongolia MNG EAP
Canada CAN NAM Namibia NAM SSA
Central African Republic CAF SSA Netherlands NLD EUR
Chile CHL LAC New Zealand NZL AAS
Colombia COL LAC Nicaragua NIC LAC
Congo, Rep. COG SSA Norway NOR EUR
Coˆte d’Ivoire CIV SSA Panama PAN LAC
Croatia HRV ECA Papua New Guinea PNG EAP
Cyprus CYP EUR Paraguay PRY LAC
Czech Republic CZE ECA Peru PER LAC
Denmark DNK EUR Poland POL ECA
Dominican Republic DOM LAC Portugal PRT EUR
El Salvador SLV LAC Romania ROM ECA
Estonia EST ECA Russian Federation RUS ECA
Ethiopia ETH SSA Slovak Republic SVK ECA
Finland FIN EUR Slovenia SVN ECA
Continued on next page
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(continued)
Country Code Region Country Code Region
France FRA EUR South Africa ZAF SSA
Georgia GEO ECA Spain ESP EUR
Germany DEU EUR Sri Lanka LKA SAS
Greece GRC EUR Sweden SWE EUR
Guatemala GTM LAC Switzerland CHE EUR
Guinea GIN SSA Syrian Arab Republic SYR MNA
Hungary HUN ECA Tajikistan TJK ECA
Iceland ISL EUR Thailand THA EAP
India IND SAS Trinidad and Tobago TTO LAC
Indonesia IDN EAP Tunisia TUN MNA
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN MNA Ukraine UKR ECA
Ireland IRL EUR United Arab Emirates ARE EUR
Israel ISR EUR United Kingdom GBR EUR
Italy ITA EUR United States USA NAM
Jamaica JAM LAC Uruguay URY LAC
Jordan JOR MNA Venezuela, RB VEN LAC
Kazakhstan KAZ ECA Zambia ZMB SSA
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